MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST:
This week, as we mark three years since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, among the many people offering up ideas for how to end that war is Alexander Vindman. Now, a little background here - Vindman was born in Ukraine, emigrated to the United States as a child. And if you recognize his name, there's a decent chance that is because of a moment back in 2019 when Vindman, by then a staffer in the Trump White House and an active duty officer in the U.S. Army, testified in impeachment hearings against his commander in chief.
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ALEXANDER VINDMAN: Dad, I'm sitting here today in the U.S. Capitol, talking to our elected professionals. Talking to our elected professionals is proof that you made the right decision 40 years ago to leave the Soviet Union and come here to the United States of America in search of a better life for our family. Do not worry. I will be fine for telling the truth.
KELLY: Well, Trump fired Vindman not long after that. Then Vindman retired from the Army, but he has not stopped thinking about the relationship between the country for which he wore a uniform and the country where he was born. His new book is "The Folly Of Realism: How The West Deceived Itself About Russia And Betrayed Ukraine."
KELLY: Alexander Vindman, welcome.
VINDMAN: Thank you for having me back.
KELLY: So the last time you and I spoke was three years ago. It was actually right before Russia invaded. Let's start with the case for hope. Do you find grounds for hope that this year, that 2025, may be the year this war ends?
VINDMAN: I don't think so - not under the approach that the Trump administration's taking. It's an approach that looks to appease Russia in the tradition of 30-plus years of Russia First policy. And it's one where, frankly, Russia is not going to be satisfied with the level of appeasement that the Trump administration is offering because the Ukrainians are not willing to capitulate. The prospects look dimmer now than they did before Trump took office.
KELLY: I mentioned your own history - that Trump fired you, that he had you marched out of his White House. Just for people listening and wondering if you have an axe to grind - do you?
VINDMAN: I've always been focused on U.S. national security. If you paid attention to any of my testimony back then or any of the commentary, it's not been about Ukraine. It's not really even been about Trump. I have no warm feelings towards him because he's a danger, in my view, to the U.S. But it's more about the professionalism that I've tried to uphold as a career military officer, as a policymaker and as an academic studying this issue.
KELLY: Well - and what's interesting is that in this latest book you make the argument that the U.S. and its allies have gotten Ukraine wrong since the collapse of the Soviet Union, like, across six U.S. presidential administrations of both parties. I'm sure there are many moments that stand out, but is there a particular one that, if it had been navigated differently, might have led us to a very different outcome today?
VINDMAN: Sure. We should be clear that it wasn't just getting Ukraine wrong; it was getting Russia wrong consistently. With regards to what we could have done to support Ukraine, there are a couple of moments that stand out. I think in the Orange Revolution in 2004, we did very, very kid-glove condemnations of Russia. We should have warned them off and invested in Ukraine, and we didn't do that. There was another turning point in 2014, when it was clear that the Russians had - were graduating from hybrid warfare to outright military aggression. We could have not...
KELLY: This is when they seized Crimea?
VINDMAN: Exactly right. We could have not done what we did, which was look to reset. But we could have avoided doing a reset and instead been quite conditional in our relationship with Russia - condemnatory when we needed to be, imposing sanctions, helping arm Ukraine so it looks like a harder target. That was another critical turning point.
KELLY: So fast-forward to this moment now - here we sit in 2025, with the world as it is, not as we wish it were, what counsel would you offer your successors at the White House, at the Pentagon on trying to end this war?
VINDMAN: What we should be doing is understanding that we could focus on long-term objectives. We could be focusing on making sure we have strong alliances with NATO, that our support for that collective defense treaty is ironclad. We should be investing in places like Ukraine or Taiwan - other places around the world that look like they could be the targets for the aggression of our adversaries. These - this is...
KELLY: I guess the pushback to that is that the Biden administration tried that - invested in the relationship with NATO, invested in Ukraine - and here we are with war still raging three years on.
VINDMAN: I would say that that's not the case. I think the fact is that the Biden administration also fell afoul of hopes and fears. It just did it in a more kind of traditional vein, the same way that preceding administrations from George H.W. Bush through Clinton, through George Bush, President Obama, all committed the same kind of Russia First mistakes. Now it looks like it's - there's a bit of a stark contrast 'cause Trump has taken such an extreme approach to realism that it looks like Biden - the Biden administration did more than they actually did. The fact is that they also were a day late and a dollar short consistently in providing support to Ukraine.
KELLY: When you argue for investing in Ukraine, is part of that argument more weapons to Ukraine? You make that case in the book.
VINDMAN: That's an essential nature of bringing the war to a close. The problem to a certain extent is that the - both sides are relatively imbalanced. The Russians are making tiny incremental gains but suffering enormous losses. They could weather some of those losses 'cause they have a larger population, they have a larger economy, but they can't do that forever. And the Ukrainians are feisty and fiery. They've historically had higher morale, performed better on the battlefield, but they have limited human resources. And you're not going to find much of a compromise when both sides feel like they're on the cusp of winning or holding out or breaking the other side.
KELLY: Last thing - do you see any grounds for optimism in the U.S.-Russia relationship? Understanding, as you've made clear, that you don't agree with the way President Trump is handling it, is it better to be talking than not to be talking?
VINDMAN: I think it's a useful thing to have some conversations if those conversations are going to yield results. In this case, what needs to happen is we need to travel the road of folly for a little bit longer, where the Trump administration is going to attempt to bring this war to a close but eventually recognize that there's really no compromising with Putin. And then the question is going to be - do we want Russia to be the winner, or do we want the U.S. to be the winner? Does Trump want Putin to be the winner, or does he want to be the winner himself? If he sees no prospect for Russia to compromise, the Russians are going to try to string along these negotiations. They're going to try to play at the fact that they're willing to end the war. But when they don't deliver, that's when there's an opportunity to rebalance and recognize that the support needs to go behind NATO, needs to go behind Ukraine, if we want to bring this war to a close.
KELLY: Retired U.S. Army Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman. His new book is "The Folly Of Realism." Alexander Vindman, thank you.
VINDMAN: Thank you. Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright NPR.
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