A MART脥NEZ, HOST:
Russia's momentum in capturing Ukrainian territory is slowing. In March, Russian troops took about 90 square miles in eastern Ukraine - nearly 40% less territory than in February. It's the fourth consecutive month Moscow has failed to exceed its previous month's advances. So what does that say, then, about the state of the conflict? I spoke about it with George Barros, an analyst with the Institute for the Study of War, a nonprofit research group in Washington, D.C. He says what we're seeing is Russian exhaustion.
GEORGE BARROS: The center of gravity for this war has been Russia's larger stockpile of its Soviet-era vehicles and its ability to be able to recruit what they call volunteers. These are essentially poor Russians who sign a military agreement to go fight in Ukraine for a large sum of money. But this is destroying the Russian economy. Russian inflation is approaching hyperinflation, with the current inflation rate between 20% and 25%. The Russian liquid reserves is running out. And some economists forecast that it could run out by the end of 2025 if not early 2026. And so, of course, the Russians' continued insistence on waging the full-throttle operations in Ukraine is really running them ragged.
MART脥NEZ: So it - would it be fair, George, to say that with Russia using so much energy and resources to not gain that much, that counts as a setback for Russia?
BARROS: At this time, yes, it is a setback, assuming that the Ukrainians are well-positioned to be able to exploit it. And of course, contingent to actually do that is, will Ukraine have the international backing to do it? If we don't give the Ukrainians what they need, then the Ukrainians won't be able to strike when the iron's hot.
MART脥NEZ: So if Russia is essentially spinning their wheels right now, why are we hearing that Vladimir Putin plans to launch a new offensive?
BARROS: The Russians have been shooting off on all cylinders in one area while resting forces in the other. I would note for you that the Russian forces in Southern Ukraine - those forces haven't been engaged in heavy combat operations really since 2023. And so they've had a year and a half to be able to rest. And those forces are the ones that we currently suspect can be preparing for offensive operations.
MART脥NEZ: Now, George, you lead a team that creates and publishes the maps of this conflict every day. And I've heard this whole thing be described as a war of attrition. I'm sure you have a very unique view of this war. Is there anything that you're seeing that you think maybe others around the world might be missing?
BARROS: Yeah. All of the analysis at the beginning of this war in 2022 suggested correctly that Russia would be best situated to dominate and win a war of attrition. However, we've actually gotten to the bizarre point where, due to Russian managerial mistakes, it is now the Ukrainians who are better situated to exploit a protracted war of attrition. There's no reason why Russia, with a population of 150 million people, should have issues with staffing and decisive manpower advantages over Ukraine.
Putin made a big mistake. He should have used the Russian Federation's monopoly of violence to coerce hundreds of thousands of Russians to go serve in Ukraine, but he's never done that - with the exception of the mobilization in 2022, but that was quite small. Instead, what he's done is he's essentially established a new social contract with Russians, which is, I don't force you to fight in Ukraine. I pay you to fight in Ukraine. And currently, the going rate is - they'll pay between $35,000 and $40,000 one-time sign-up bonus, and that is eviscerating the Russian coffers.
MART脥NEZ: Has anything changed at all, specifically? Has the battlefield changed since President Trump took office and tried to broker a peace deal?
BARROS: Yeah. The most significant change on the map, obviously, is the Ukrainian holdings in Kursk Oblast in Russia. The Ukrainians conducted an ambitious cross-border operation into Russia back in August 2024, and the Russians had eliminated about 60% of it before Donald Trump took office. But then, in early March, immediately following the American intelligence-sharing cutoff to Ukraine, the Russians exploited that. And currently, today, the Ukrainians are all but expelled from Kursk. I'm not prepared to say that the cutoff was directly what caused the Russians to be able to retake Kursk, but it certainly accelerated the current trend. And interestingly, once the intelligence-sharing was reconnected and the Ukrainians were able to target Russian forces in Kursk more effectively, the Russian rate of advance in Kursk has been drastically slowed down.
MART脥NEZ: I know Russia is making a push for the U.S. to lift sanctions and do more business in Russia. How might either of those things change what's happening on the battlefield?
BARROS: As with regards to the sanctions relief that Russia seeks, that would be a strategic mistake. We know that the Russians are rejiggering their command structures. They are restructuring their army to figure out, what went wrong in Ukraine and how can we be better for the next war? And so to give the Russians sanctions relief now, especially on the sanctions that help constrain Russia's defense industrial base - that's like feeding the tiger you're in a room with.
MART脥NEZ: George Barros is the Russia team and geospatial intelligence lead at the Institute for the Study of War. George, thanks.
BARROS: Thank you so much for having me, A. Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright NPR.
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